


Introducing: Bad


Bad is not bad. It is not good either—by any virtuous or ethical measure—because bad does not necessarily connote an ideology, or otherwise signify some pre-existing or a priori value. What bad represents is a form of "trained judgement" that thrives at the convergence of tacit and explicit disciplinary knowledge.² In this sense, bad is situated between positive and negative epistemic modalities; under certain circumstances it provokes the establishment of some new reference and in other instances bad destabilizes existing cultures or systems of classification, altering both political and aesthetic subjectivities.3 In this sense, bad belongs to a special class of reflective aesthetic judgements that precede, or emerge in response to the production of new knowledge, and which work to activate and mutate the numerous subjectivities that are responsible for conditioning and enforcing those sensibilities that we value. In contrast to determinative judgements such as good, cute, or cool, which represent specific idealized virtues, bad can be recognized by the absence or negation of previously defined qualities; it represents a transitive moment preceding the establishment of a sensibility, or specific frame of knowing. Behaving in a manner similar to "interest," which the literary critic Sianne Ngai, defines as the synthesis of "affect-based judgement and concept-based explanation," bad operates as both performance and pedagogy in assigning value to a thing that has yet to be conceptualized or that diverges from a recognized norm in unfamiliar ways; the value(s) of bad is subsequently contingent on its ability to wrest novelty from the familiar. In other words, interest can cultivate the attention we direct toward something the same way that bad things provoke a confrontation with those ideas or standards that we most previously found satisfactory.


Lurking inside this confrontation with the previously satisfactory, or good, is a necessary sacrifice, the inevitable and occasionally unconscious decision to subsume or expel a disciplinary reference, habit, or principle. This could be a particular area of knowledge, such as an encyclopedic familiarity with the classical orders, or mastery of a range of techniques like those associated with manual drafting. Architectural history is built on the sediment of things and ideas that were at some point satisfactory, but which were eventually transformed into various types of anachronisms. Consider the introduction of Hal Foster's, The Return of the Real (1996), whose critical examination of artistic practices associated with the post-war Avant-Garde began by asking, "how do we tell the difference between a return to an archaic form of art that bolsters conservative tendencies in the present and a return to a lost model of art made to displace customary ways of working?" 6 Indeed, how does a discipline—and its attendant institutions—negotiate between promoting
















extended interpretation of the boundaries of things as both material and metaphysical substances see Tristan Garcia. Form and Object: A Treatise on Things (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014) pp38-46

concepts that undermine certain intrinsic virtues, while simultaneously maintaining those orthodoxies from which their collective disciplinary identity is constructed? The answer, obviously, is *bad*.

As a starting point for clarifying our understanding of bad we might ask the following: how do things—objects, concepts, landscapes, the real and the virtual—become architectural? 7 Historically, this quality could be contingent on the application of familiar typological elements such as the courtyard, the legibility of an originating urform, or the adherence to an institutionally promulgated organizational schema—the classical orders or grids, for example. Some vestiges of these continue to haunt architectural culture at-large. More recent histories of things-becomingarchitectural have favored the formatting associated with various representational traditions. For some, it would seem that images have superseded objects as premier examples of the architectural, and that the latter exhibit disciplinary purposiveness only in direct reciprocity to their representational origins. Are there other processes through which things enter into the disciplinary territory of the architectural? By way of provoking our attention and cultivating recognition through judgement, it would seem that bad is on some fundamental level concerned with disciplinarity, and once recognized, it serves to further alter the epistemic forces that underwrite the latter. More precisely, bad implicates those subjectivities intrinsic to practice, arising from the institutions and traditions that we collectively reinforce as extensions of techniques, pedagogies, criticism, or models of research, etc. Likewise, since bad is manifested through exercising some type of trained judgement in practice, it inevitably contends with the techniques and methods of observation and representation. In this sense, bad objects, are those things that through negation or absence subsume certain institutional orthodoxies—such as 20th-century definitions of spatiality and transparency, or prescribed forms of viewing—in favor of new emerging modes of abstraction.8 Recent conversations about objects have been either reinforced or dismissed relative to their association with the metaphysical musings of speculative realism or Object-Oriented Ontologies (000). The bad objects presented here are wholly within the purview of the discipline and are architecturally specific without relying on the reference to other inaccessible subjectivities. Instead, bad objects articulate classes of emerging characteristics that reflect the changing conditions of how architecture is both conceived, interpreted, and described. Though diverse in origin, these changes are generally alterations to the epistemic virtues of the latter; they inform how we construct the ontologies that influence our cultural and disciplinary institutions, and, as a result, they anticipate what will cultivate our attention and what will challenge those supporting standards and norms.

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